Some Queries about “Some Queries” by Biasiori, Lucio
 
Cromohs (Cyber Review of  Modern Historiography), ISSN 1123-7023, 18/2013 
© Firenze University Press 
Some Queries about “Some Queries” 
 
LUCIO BIASIORI 
Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa 
 
 
Discussing a paper by Carlo Ginzburg makes me feel like the Italian singer Mino 
Reitano, when he had to open a Beatles concert in Hamburg in the ‘60s. But joking 
apart, it is not easy for me to talk about a man who is at the same time so distant and 
yet so close to me: a methodological polestar for historians all over the globe, who I 
was privileged to have as my teacher and mentor in Pisa. All that I can say is that, 
although Ginzburg never conceals the personal circumstances that shaped his 
historical trajectory,1 this essay is, as far as I know, the first occasion on which 
historical writing and self-reflection are interwoven from start to finish. Among the 
various ways in which one could read a text like this, it would nonetheless be limiting 
to approach it as a short intellectual autobiography. Limiting and, I would add, 
misleading. By doing so, one would be completely paralyzed not only by the breadth 
of  Ginzburg’s expertise, but also by the eminence of  his interlocutors. In a few pages 
one can find names like Auerbach, Bloch, Cantimori, Contini, De Martino, 
Dionisotti, Spitzer (to name just the scholars, but even two popes are mentioned!). 
As a dwarf  on the shoulders of  a giant, I will try, on the contrary, to raise some 
queries about Some Queries.2 In other words, my purpose is to render explicit the 
methodological implications hidden behind the “team” Ginzburg has enlisted and, 
tentatively, to propose to him a couple of  substitutions in this extraordinary line-up.  
I will limit myself  to just one point: the relationship between exception and norm, 
cases and their generalization, and I shall begin from so-called microhistory. 
Although Ginzburg has always professed that he has little interest in labels, especially 
with regards to those that have been applied to his activity, he has devoted a self-
reflective essay to the origin of  the category: “Microhistory. Two or three things I 
know about it.”3 An important passage was apparently left aside by Ginzburg’s 
genealogy of  microhistory. Reviewing Pietro Treves’s Lo studio dell’antichità classica 
nell’Ottocento, Sebastiano Timpanaro wrote:  
The preference for a prevalently ethical-political historiography is linked, in Treves, to 
a disdain for philology in the narrow sense of  the term (textual criticism, 
interpretation), which he describes time and time again as mere “technique”, clearly 
distinguishing it from history. In opposition to a certain kind of  over-reliance on 
philology – and there is a risk that it may become predominant in historical studies 
today – which presumes to expunge any “practical-political” interest from 
historiography, Treves’ protest has a certain value. But slipping into a Crocean 
conception of  a philology that is purely instrumental with respect to ethical-political 
history or to literary criticism is not, in my view, the right way to react to such an over-
                                                 
1 Just think of  the self-examination contained in the foreword to Clues, Myths and the Historical Method. 
2 Carlo Ginzburg, “Some Queries Addressed to Myself,” first published in Premi Balzan 2010 (Milan), 
now in Cromohs 18 (2013). 
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reliance. The interpretation of  a passage and the reconstruction of  a badly transmitted 
text are historiographic tasks: they are, if  you like, “micro-history.” This should 
certainly not stifle the need for a broader cultural or political-social history, but nor is 
it simply a means for those vaster syntheses. Textual and exegetic philology – the 
philology of  the likes of  Porson, Herman or Leopardi – is autonomous to the same 
degree that one can consider autonomous any human activity which, insofar as it is 
distinct from others due to a practical necessity for a division of  labour, always carries 
within it the danger of  the sectorialism of  specialist narrowness.4 
These words were written in 1963, more or less when Ginzburg decided to 
become an historian, by a man who was very close to him in the early period of  his 
intellectual life. My question therefore is: How important was Timpanaro not only 
for “the impulse that generated microhistory” (as he says in his paper and as the 
aforementioned passage could suggest), but for the turn from a social, “low” 
microhistory (think of  Night Battles, or The Cheese and the Worms) to a cultural, “high” 
one (as in the works on Piero della Francesca, Aristotle, Montaigne, Voltaire, 
Augustine and now on Dante).5 It is perhaps no coincidence that the text in which 
this turn is most evident, Clues (1979), is deeply influenced by Timpanaro’s Freudian 
Slip and that Ginzburg used to call his way of  interpreting the past “philology à la 
Giambattista Vico,” a definition behind which one can clearly recognize Auerbach, 
but which Timpanaro would not have disliked, although he mentioned Porson, 
Hermann, Leopardi and not Vico.  
But the case is in Ginzburg’s methodological view just the starting point, because 
“one intensely studied case can be the starting point for a generalization. I would 
add: yes, above all if  it is an anomalous case, because anomaly implies the norm 
(whereas the opposite is not true).”6  
In the London Review of  Books, Perry Anderson made a radical objection to 
Ginzburg’s argument, turning it inside out: “By definition, an anomaly is only such in 
                                                 
4 Sebastiano Timpanaro, “Classicismo e ‘neoguelfismo’ negli studi di antichità dell’Ottocento italiano” 
[review of  Lo studio dell’antichità classica nell’Ottocento, ed. by Piero Treves (Milan-Naples, Ricciardi, 
1962)], Critica storica 2 (1963), pp. 603–11 [republished in Id., Aspetti e figure della cultura ottocentesca (Pisa 
1980), pp. 371–86]: “Con la predilezione per una storiografia orientata in senso prevalentemente etico-
politico si connette, nel Treves, il disprezzo per la filologia in senso stretto (critica testuale, 
interpretazione), che egli qualifica più e più volte come mera “tecnica”, distinguendola recisamente 
dalla storia. Contro un certo tipo di filologismo che oggi rischia di prevalere negli studi storici, e che 
presume di espungere dalla storiografia ogni interesse “pratico-politico”, la protesta del Treves ha il 
suo valore. Ma ricadere nella concezione crociana di una filologia puramente strumentale rispetto alla 
storia etico-politica o alla critica letteraria, non è, a mio parere, il modo giusto di reagire al filologismo. 
L’interpretazione di un passo, la ricostruzione di un testo mal tramandato, sono lavoro storiografico: 
sono, se vogliamo, “micro-storia”, la quale non deve certo soffocare l’esigenza di una storia più ampia, 
culturale o politico-sociale, ma non è neppure semplice mezzo per quelle più vaste sintesi. La filologia 
testuale ed esegetica – la filologia di un Porson, di un Hermann, di un Leopardi – è autonoma nella 
stessa misura in cui si può considerare autonoma qualsiasi attività umana, la quale, in quanto distinta 
da altre per una necessità pratica di divisione del lavoro, reca sempre in sé il pericolo del settorialismo 
dell’angustia specialistica.” I warmly thank my friend Ignazio Veca, who brought this text to my 
attention. 
5 This does not mean the existence of  two microhistories, as suggested by Alberto Mario Banti, 
“Storie e microstorie: l’histoire sociale contemporaine en Italie (1972–1989),” Genèses 3 (1991), pp. 
134–47.  
6 See Ginzburg, “Some Queries Addressed to Myself.” 
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terms of  a rule, which ontologically commands it. If  there is no rule, there can be no 
exception to it. But the converse does not hold. A rule does not depend for its 
existence on an exception. For there are rules that admit of  no exceptions: 
mathematical ones, in the first place, but not only them.”7 I am not strong enough on 
epistemology to be able to say if  Ginzburg or Anderson is right. Rather, I wonder if  
this divergence could be rooted in their respective political formation: the Marxist 
intellectual on the one hand, and on the other, Ginzburg, born as he was within a 
tradition that developed almost entirely outside of  soviet communism. By the way, in 
an interview with the Corriere della Sera, Ginzburg complained about the tendency of  
Italian students to hide the elements of  novelty of  their work, in favour of  those 
referable to a norm; he ascribed this tendency to three factors: the catholic tradition, 
the communist one, and the corruption introduced by Berlusconi.8 Leaving aside the 
simplification introduced by journalists, I am very curious to know whether the fact 
that in Some Queries he mentioned (for the first time, as far as I know) the founder of  
the catholic-communist movement, Felice Balbo, could be read as a sort of  
mitigation of  that harsh statement. 
Nonetheless in Ginzburg’s books the study of  anomaly has never become 
something for its own sake. He rejects the analysis of  anomaly per se and often says 
that one of  the aspects dividing him from Michel Foucault and his school is his 
treatment of  anomaly not as an eccentricity to admire, but as a cognitive model.9 A 
model to reconstruct, “a generalization,” to reach “the norm.” And here comes my 
question: is Ginzburg really interested in the norm? As a keen reader of  his books 
and as one of  his pupils, I have to say that I have never see any norm as being the 
end of  his works. Is the norm actually the ultimate object of  his research, or is the 
“force of  the anomaly” – as Anderson puts it – to be found elsewhere? Clifford 
Geertz once wrote that Cromwell was the most typical Englishman of  his time 
because he was the weirdest. I have to say that this statement does not satisfy me. Do 
we really have to use such refined tools, delving into the extremely small, exploring 
problems neglected or misunderstood by scholarship, to discover the normal, the 
typical? In other words, and drawing on an example from Ginzburg’s research, is 
Menocchio the true Renaissance Man? And if  so, how is it actually possible to 
achieve the norm by starting from the anomaly? And what kind of  norm do we 
reach? What is not clear, at least to me, is how we can rise from the anomaly to the 
norm. On this point Ginzburg mentioned the famous oxymoron of  the Italian 
historian Edoardo Grendi, “eccezionale/normale.” Grendi himself  said that his 
formula was “certainly overrated.”10 I do not want, on my part, to overrate Grendi’s 
understatement, but it is no accident that on both occasions when those words crop 
up, they have a particular meaning. In 1977, when the oxymoron appeared for the 
first time, “the historian works on many indirect sources. In this situation the 
                                                 
7 Perry Anderson, “The Force of  the Anomaly,” London Review of  Books (26 April 2012) pp. 3–13. 
8 Il corriere della sera (28 october 2010), p. 41 (interview by Dino Messina) 
9 The first time Ginzburg distanced himself  from Foucault is in a forgotten review of  Foucault’s 
History of  Insanity, in Studi medievali, (1963), pp. 412–14. In that short text many arguments of  the 
introduction to The Cheese and the Worms are anticipated. 
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exceptional document can be exceptionally normal, just because it is relevant.”11 In 
1994, when Grendi ironically distanced himself  from the success enjoyed by his own 
statement, he added that “the document is exceptional inasmuch as it mirrors a 
normality, so normal that often it remains silent.”12 Grendi spoke about “exceptional 
documents” useful for knowing something about a “reality” that is otherwise 
“silent”. Taking into account also the dismissive tone Grendi adopted to reflect on 
his own statement, it seems that the relationship between exception and norm 
concerns most of  all our way of  approaching the past, not the reconstruction of  the 
past itself. In other words, it has more to do with method than with the object of  the 
history. The new turn Ginzburg’s work impressed on Grendi’s “eccezionale normale” 
does not lie, in my view, in applying this movement from exception to the norm to 
the objects, but in exploiting its methodological potential in two opposite directions. 
The first one, as in the first part of  Ginzburg’s career, where there was an almost 
complete lack of  sources, the second one where the documental situation was too 
crowded. In both cases, this exception-norm relationship is more visible at the 
beginning of  any of  his works, rather than at their end, more evident in questions 
than in answers, unless the rule he mentioned is the very possibility of  a contact with 
the past itself. 
I think – but I do not claim to know more than he does about his own work, nor 
am I sure that we are really at odds on this point – therefore that his interest in 
anomalies does not have the philosophical background he insists on, going back to 
Kierkegaard through Schmitt (see n11), but rather an anthropological one, where the 
guardian angel could be identified in James George Frazer, not so much as the author 
of  the Golden Bough but as the commentator of  Ovid’s Fasti.13 In that monumental 
commentary, Frazer recollected a lot of  strange customs drawn from savages in 
order to explain Roman culture. Like him, and like his beloved 17th-century 
antiquarians, Ginzburg seems to go in search of  the anomaly not in order to 
reconstruct the norm, but rather with an eye to the breaking point of  the past, the 
“ring that does not hold”, in order to make contact with the other culture. What 
might appear to his reader to be the longest way to reach the past is for him the 
shortest one, and the anomaly can thus be seen as the best way to read between the 
lines, or to grasp pieces of  the past that slipped the notice of  contemporaries 
themselves.  
From this point of  view it is not surprising that the centre of  Ginzburg’s work 
has shifted from clues to an interest in anomalies, visible in Ecstasies, through to 
comparison, as in his last writings.14 The reflexion on the anomaly can indeed be seen 
as the trait-d’-union between his interest in the evidential paradigm and in the origin of  
comparison. To recognize something as anomalous, that is, uncontrolled by the 
observed object, as in Clues, raises the comparative question: “Why do they do this 
                                                 
11 Edoardo Grendi., “Micro-analisi e storia sociale,” Quaderni storici 35 (1977), pp. 506–20: 512. 
12 Ibid. 
13 On this text, see Maurizio Bettini, “Comparare i Romani. Un’antropologia del mondo antico,” Studi 
Italiani di filologia classica (2009), supplement to 1/2009 [‘La stella sta compiendo il suo giro’: Atti del Convegno 
Internazionale di Siracusa 21–23 maggio 2007], pp. 1–47. 
14 Carlo Ginzburg, “Provincializing the World. Europeans, Indians, Jews (1704),” Postcolonial Studies  14 
(2011), pp. 135–50. 
A CONVERSATION WITH CARLO GINZBURG 
 
 
Cromohs 18/2013 - p. 122 
and why do we not do this?,” a question that in my view can be found at the roots of  
Ginzburg’s recent interest in the emic/etic dichotomy15 and in the category of  
comparison.  
The last question I would like to ask, the one closest to my own work, is also 
linked to the relationship between exception and rule. Ten years ago he wrote a paper 
entitled: “Machiavelli, the exception and the rule.”16 The conclusions of  that essay 
are well known: far from being the discoverer of  the rules that govern politics, 
Machiavelli was rather a thinker of  the exception. Has Machiavelli helped Ginzburg 
to formalize the opposition between rule and exception or was this issue something 
he had previously reflected on and which he tried to apply to Machiavelli? 
While Ginzburg’s essays are invariably very influential, the ones he wrote on 
Machiavelli have remained almost totally unheard by the international scholarship on 
the Florentine Secretary.17 Why has this happened? Is it only because most of  them 
have been published in Italian, or are not collected in a single volume (and they 
deserve to be)? Meanwhile, an English version of  “Machiavelli, the exception and the 
rule” has been released in a Festschrift in memory of  Giovanni Aquilecchia.18 So let’s 
wait for it to circulate before answering this question. But it is precisely this English 
translation that prompts my last question, or rather a curiosity: between the original 
text and the translation there are just a couple of  differences. Yet one of  them is 
significant, and I would like to ask the reason for the change, because it touches on a 
point from which my own work on Machiavelli started as well. One of  the most 
striking findings of  that article is that the history of  the reception of  Machiavelli’s 
work, going back from Leo Strauss and Maritain through to Pierre Bayle, Caspar 
Schoppe and Agostino Nifo, can be used to shed light on aspects of  Machiavelli’s 
thought that we had lost sight of. A risky tool, but one with very great potential 
indeed. As an example of  this approach Ginzburg mentioned the work of  the 
famous art historian Roberto Longhi. But in the Italian text the reference is to 
Frammento siciliano, in the translation to Fortuna storica di Piero. A small detail, but it is 
Carlo Ginzburg himself  who taught us that God loves to hide in the detail. Is he of  
the same opinion thirty years later? And where is God for him today? 
                                                 
15 Carlo Ginzburg, “Our Words and Theirs. A Reflection on the Historian’s Craft Today,” in Historical 
Knowledge. In Quest of  Theory, Method and Evidence, ed. by S. Fellman and M. Rahikainen (Cambridge 
2012), pp. 97–119, now in Cromohs 18 (2013). 
16 Carlo Ginzburg, “Machiavelli, l’eccezione e la regola,” Quaderni storici 112 (2003), pp. 195-214.  
17 Id., “Diventare Machiavelli. Per una nuova lettura dei Ghiribizzi al Soderini,” Quaderni storici 121 
(2006), pp. 151–64; Id., Ein Plädoyer für den Kasus, in J. Süssmann, S. Scholz, G. Engel eds. Fallstudien. 
Theorie Geschichte Methode (Berlin 2007), pp. 29–48; Id., “Spuren einer Paradigmengabelung. Machiavelli, 
Galilei und die Zensur der Gegenreformation,” in S. Krämer, W. Kogge, G. Grube eds. Spur. 
Spurenlesen als Orientierungstechnik und Wissenskunst (Frankfurt am Main 2007), pp. 257–80; Id., “Pontano, 
Machiavelli and Prudence. Some Further Reflections,” in D. Ramada Curto; E. R. Dursteler, J. 
Kirshner, N. Koniordos, F. Trivellato eds, From Florence to the Mediterranean and Beyond. Essays in Honour 
of  Anthony Molho (Firenze 2009), pp. 117–25; Id., “Machiavelli e gli antiquari,” in M. Donattini, G. 
Marcocci, S. Pastore eds, L’Europa divisa e gli altri mondi. Per Adriano Prosperi, vol. 2 (Pisa 2011), pp. 3–9. 
18 Dilwyn Knox and Nuccio Ordine eds, Renaissance Learning and Letters. In memoriam Giovanni 
Aquilecchia (Oxford-London  2012). 
